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They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. This dissertation consists of three chapters on topics in labor economics.
Firms will accordingly under-invest in discovering novice talent unless they can claim the benefit from doing so.
I test this model's relevance in an online labor market by hiring 952 workers at random from an applicant pool of 3,767 for a 10-hour data entry job.
In this market, worker performance is publicly observable.If you do not wish to become a member of EALE you should follow the guidelines in the email regarding how to send your payment - of EUR 75, USD 100, Y 8,000.The submission fee revenue is used to support journal related activities and is non-refundable.Consistent with the model's prediction, novice workers hired at random obtained significantly more employment and had higher earnings than the control group, following the initial hiring spell.A second treatment confirms that this causal effect is likely explained by information revelation rather than skills acquisition.In response to this cost change, ACT-takers sent more score reports and applications, while SAT-takers did not.ACT-takers also widened the range of colleges to which they sent scores.Providing the market with more detailed information about the performance of a subset of the randomly-hired workers raised earnings of high-productivity workers and decreased earnings of low-productivity workers.Due to its scale, the experiment significantly increased the supply of workers recognized as high-ability in the market.This outward supply shift raised subsequent total employment and decreased average wages in occupations affected by the experiment (relative to non-treated occupations), implying that it also increased the sum of worker and employer surplus.Under plausible assumptions, this additional total surplus exceeds the social cost of the experiment.